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1. Introduction
This chapter discusses energy planning in a small district composed of a set of corporate
entities. Although the term “energy planning” has a number of different meanings, the energy
planning in this chapter stands for finding a set of energy sources and conversion devices so
as to meet the energy demands of all the tasks in an optimal manner. Since reduction of CO2
emissions which are the main factor of global warming is one of the most important problems
in the 21st century about preservation of the earth environment, recent researches on energy
planning consider reducing impacts to the environment(Cormio et al., 2003; Dicorato et al.,
2008; Hiremath et al., 2007).
On the other hand, corporate entities with energy conversion devices become possible to sale
surplus energy by deregulation about energy trading. Normally conversion devices have non-
linear characteristics; its efficiency depends on the operating point. By selling energy to other
entities, one may have an opportunity to operate its devices at a more efficient point.
We suppose a small district, referred to be a “group”, that composed of independent plural
corporate entities, referred to be “agents”, and in the group trading of electricity and heat
energies among agents are allowed. We also suppose that a cap on CO2 emissions is imposed
on each agent. Each agent performs energy planning under the constraints on CO2 emissions
and by considering energy trading in the group.
An agent may take various actions for reduction: use of alternative and renewable energy
sources, use of or replacement to highly-efficient conversion devices, purchase of emission
credits, and so on. Use of alternative and renewable energy sources and purchase of emission
credits are easier ways to reduce CO2 emissions. However, there is no guarantee to get suf-
ficient amount of such energy or credit at an appropriate price, because the amount of such
energy and credit is limited and their prices are resolved in the market. On the other hand,
installing a highly-efficient conversion device comes expensive.
Another way to reduce CO2 emissions is energy trading among agents. Suppose that one
agent is equipped with an energy conversion device such as boilers, co-generation systems,
etc. If he operates his device according to his energy demands only, the operating point of
the device cannot be the most efficient one. Energy trading among agents makes it possible to
seek efficient use of devices, and as a result to reduce CO2 emissions.
When we attempt to minimize energy cost under the constraints on CO2 emissions in the
group, it is not difficult by considering the entire group as one agent. But it is another matter
2
www.intechopen.com
Energy Management18
whether each agent will accept the centralized optimal solution because agents are indepen-
dent. Therefore, we adopt a cooperative energy planning method instead of total optimiza-
tion. By this method, we want to reduce energy consumption considering the amount of the
CO2 emissions in the entire group without undermining the economic benefit to each agent.
A software system in the control center in a power grid to control and optimize the perfor-
mance of the generation and/or transmission system is known as an energy management
system (EMS). We are considering a distributed software system that performs energy plan-
ning in the group. We call such a energy planning system for the group a distributed energy
management system (DEMS).
Corresponding mathematical formulation of the energy planning is known as the unit com-
mitment (UC) problem(Padhy, 2004; Sheble & Fahd, 1994). Although the goal of our research
is solving the UC problem and deciding the allocation of traded energies in DEMSs, the main
topic of this chapter is to discuss how to find an optimal energy allocation. In order to make
the problem simple, we consider the UC problem with only one time period and all of the
energy conversion devices are active. Most methods for the UC problem solve in centralized
manner. But as mentioned before we cannot apply any centralized method. Nagata et al.
(2002) proposed a multi-agent based method for the UC problem. But they did not consider
energy trading among agents.
The interest of this chapter is how to decide the allocation of traded energies through coordi-
nation among agents. In DEMSs, an allocation that minimize the cost of a group is preferred;
a sequential auction may be preferred. Therefore, we propose to apply the market-oriented
programming (MOP)(Wellman, 1993) into DEMSs.
The MOP is known as a multi-agent protocol for distributed problem solving, and an optimal
resource allocation for a set of computational agents is derived by computing general equilib-
rium of an artificial economy. Some researches, which uses the MOP, have been reported in
the fields of the supply chain management(Kaihara, 2001), B2B commerce(Kaihara, 2005), and
so on. Maiorano et al. (2003) discuss the oligopolistic aspects of an electricity market.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the DEMSs and an example group.
An application of the MOP into DEMSs is described in Section 3. The bidding strategy of
agents and an energy allocation method based on the MOP is described. In Section 4, com-
putational evaluation of the MOP method is performed comparing with three other methods.
The first comparative method is an multi-items and multi-attributes auction-based method.
The second one is called the individual optimization method, and this method corresponds
to a case where internal energy trading is not allowed. The last one is the whole optimization
method.
2. Distributed Energy Management Systems
2.1 Introduction
A software system in the control center in a power grid to control and optimize the perfor-
mance of the generation and/or transmission system is known as an energy management
system (EMS). This chapter addresses an operations planning problem of an EMS in indepen-
dent corporate entities. Each of them demands electricity and heat energies, and he knows
their expected demand curves. Moreover a cap on CO2 emissions is imposed on each en-
tity, and it is not allowed to exhaust CO2 more than their caps. Some (or all) entities are
equipped with energy conversion devices such as turbines; they perform optimal planning of
purchasing primal energy and operating energy conversion devices in order to satisfy energy
demands and constraints on CO2 emissions.
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We suppose a small district, referred to be a “group”, that composed of independent plural
corporate entities, referred to be “agents”, and in the group trading of electricity and heat
energies among agents is allowed. In the case of co-generation systems, demands should be
balanced between electricity and heat in order to operate efficiently. Even when demands
from himself are not balanced, if an agent was possible to sell surplus energy in the group,
efficiency of the co-generation system might be increased. Normally conversion devices have
non-linear characteristics; its efficiency depends on the operating point. By selling energy to
other entities, one may have an opportunity to operate its devices at a more efficient point.
There is a merit for consumers that they are possible to obtain energies at a low price.
It is possible to consider the whole group to be one agent, and to perform optimization by a
centralized method, referred to be a “whole optimization”. The whole optimization comes up
with a solution which gives the lower bound of group cost; since each agent is independent,
there exists another problem that each agent accepts the solution by the whole optimization
or not.
The DEMS is a software (multi-agent) system that seeks optimal planning of purchasing pri-
mal energy and operating energy conversion devices in order to satisfy energy demands and
constraints on CO2 emissions by considering energy trading in the group. The cost for each
agent is defined by the difference between the total cost of purchased energy and the income
of sold energy; the cost of the group is defined by the sum of agent’s costs. We are expecting
that the group cost is minimized as a result of profit-seeking activities of agents.
Generally, energy demands are time varying and cost arises at starting conversion devices up.
Although the goal of our research is solving the UC problem and deciding the allocation of
traded energies in DEMSs, the main topic of this chapter is to discuss how to find an optimal
energy allocation. In order to make the problem simple, we consider the UC problem with
only one time period and all of the energy conversion devices are active.
In DEMSs, since a cap on CO2 emissions is imposed on each agent, it is necessary that a pro-
ducer is able to impute his overly-emitted CO2 to consumers in energy trading. Therefore,
we employ not only the unit price but also the CO2 emission basic unit for energy trading.
The CO2 emission basic unit means the amount of CO2 emitted by energy consumption of
one unit. Power companies and gas companies calculate CO2 emission basic unit of their
selling energies in consideration of relative proportions of their own energy conversion de-
vices or constituents of products, and companies have been made them public. Consumers
are possible to calculate their CO2 emissions came from their purchased energy. Note that
CO2 emission basic unit is considered just as one of attributes of a energy in DEMSs, and its
value could be decided independent of relative proportions of energy conversion devices or
constituents of products.
In a group, agents are connected by electricity grids and heat pipelines; they are able to trans-
mit energies via these facilities. The electricity grid connects each pair of agents, but the heat
pipeline is laid among a subset of agents. We do not take capacities of electricity grids and
heat pipelines into account; also no wheeling charge is considered.
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2.2 Example Group
electricity
heat
agent
group
Factory1 Factory2
Building
gas
Fig. 1. An example group
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gas
Fig. 2. A building model
Figure 1 depicts an example group that is a subject of this chapter. This group is composed
of three agents: Factory1, Factory2, and Building. The arrows indicate energy flows; two
factories purchase electricity and gas from outside of the group and sell electricity and heat in
the group, and Building purchases electricity, gas and heat from both of inside and outside of
the group.
Composition of each agent is shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. BA is a boiler and GT is a gas-turbine.
BEe and BE express electricity purchased from outside and inside of the group, respectively.
BG expresses gas purchased from outside of the group; BH expresses heat purchased from
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Fig. 3. A factory model
inside of the group. PH is the produced heat and PE is the generated electricity. DE, DH, and
WH express electricity demand, heat demand, and waste heat, respectively. Building tries to
meet his electricity demand by purchasing electricity from inside and outside of the group,
and he tries to meet his heat demand by producing heat with his boiler and by purchasing
heat in the group. Factories tries to meed his electricity demand by generating electricity with
his gas-turbine and by purchasing electricity from outside of the group, and he tried to meet
his heat demand by producing heat with his boiler and/or gas-turbine.
3. Application of the Market-Oriented Programming into DEMSs
3.1 Market-Oriented Programming
The Market-Oriented Programming (MOP)(Wellman, 1993) is a method for constructing a
virtual perfect competitive market on computers, computing a competitive equilibrium as
a result of the interaction between agents involved in the market, and deriving the Pareto
optimum allocation of goods. For formulation of the MOP, it is necessary to define (1) goods,
(2) agents, and (3) agent’s bidding strategies.
A market is opened for each good, and the value (unit price) of a good is managed by the
market. Each agent cannot control the value, and he makes bids by the quantity of goods in
order to maximize his own profit under the presented values. Each market updates the value
in compliance with market principles (Fig. 4). Namely, when the demand exceeds the supply,
the market raises the unit price; when the supply exceeds the demand, the market lowers the
unit price. The change of unit price is iterated until the demand is equal to the supply in all
markets; the state is called an equilibrium.
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equilibrium 
price
price
amount
demand curve supply curve
overdemand
oversupply
update price lower
update price higher
Fig. 4. Price updating in the market
3.2 Formulation of Markets
For the formulation of MOP, we define (1) goods (2) agents, and (3) agent’s bidding strategies
as follows:
(1) goods
Electricity and heat traded in the group are goods.
(2) agents
A corporate entity in the group is an agent, and an agent that has energy converters
such as turbines can become a producer or a consumer, but it cannot be a producer and
a consumer at the same time.
(3) agent’s bidding strategies
Bidding strategies will be described in Section 3.3.
3.3 Bidding Strategies
Let P = {p1, · · · , pn} be a set of agents. The set E of electricity energies is defined as follows:
E = {Eij|pi, pj ∈ P} ∪ {Eei|pi ∈ P}, (1)
where Eij denotes electricity supplied from agent pi to agent pj, and Eei denotes electricity
that agent pi purchased from outside of the group. The electricity Eij is a pair (αEij , βEij ); αEij
is the unit price, and βEij is the CO2 emissions basic unit of Eij. The electricity Eei is also a pair
(αEei , βEei ). There exists only one kind of electricity in outside of the group, i.e. ∀i, j, αEei = αEej
and βEei = βEej .
The set of heat energies is represented by H = {Hij}, (i, j = 1, · · · , n, i = j), where Hij denots
heat that is supplied from agent pi to agent pj. Also the heat Hij is a pair (αHij , βHij ); αHij is
the unit price, and βHij is the CO2 emissions basic unit.
K = {Kwi}, (i = 1, · · · , n) represents the set of other energies, such as gas, that are supplied
to agent pi from outside of the group. Kwi is a pair (αKwi , βKwi ); αKwi is the unit price, and βKwi
is the CO2 emissions basic unit.
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The amount of traded electricity E ∈ E is expressed by a map Q : E → R+, where R+ is
the set of non-negative real numbers. Here the following equations must hold for purchased
electricity BEi and sold electricity SEi of agent pi:
BEi = ∑
j =i∨j=e
Q(Eji), and (2)
SEi = ∑
j =i∨j=e
Q(Eij). (3)
The amount of traded heat H ∈ H is expressed by a map R : H → R+. The following
equations must hold for purchased heat BHi and sold heat SHi of agent pi:
BHi = ∑
j =i
R(Hji), and (4)
SHi = ∑
j =i
R(Hij). (5)
BKwi, DEi, DHi, and WHi express the amount of purchased energy Kwi, the demand, the head,
and the waste heat of agent pi, respectively.
The cost Ji of agent pi is calculated by the following equation:
Ji = ∑
j =i∨j=e
αEji ·Q(Eji) + ∑
j =i
αHji · R(Hji) + ∑
Kwi∈K
αKwi · BKwi
−∑
j =i
αEij ·Q(Eij)−∑
j =i
αHij · R(Hij). (6)
The CO2 emissions CO2i of agent pi is calculated by the following equation:
CO2i = ∑
j =i∨j=e
βEji ·Q(Eji) + ∑
j =i
βHji · R(Hji) + ∑
Kwi∈K
βKwi · BKwi
−∑
j =i
βEij ·Q(Eij)−∑
j =i
βHij · R(Hij). (7)
Let Ki be the cap on CO2 emissions for agent pi. Then the following equation must hold.
CO2i ≤ Ki (8)
Let Ui = {u1, · · · , um} be the set of energy conversion devices of agent pi. Each device has
input-output characteristic function:
Γk : R
+{IEk ,IHk ,IKwik} → R+{OEk ,OHk}, (9)
where IEk is the amount of input electricity, IHk is the amount of input heat, IKwik is the
amount of input energy Kwi, OEk is the amount of output electricity, and OHk is the amount
of output heat for device uk. The form of a characteristic function depends on the conversion
device; in the case of gas boiler it could be expressed by the following function:
OHk = p(IKwik)
b + d, (10)
where p, b, and d are parameters. For adding constraints on output range, inequality can be
used:
OHK ≤ OHk ≤ OHk, (11)
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where OHK and OHk are the minimum output and the maximum output, respectively.
The following energy balance equations for each energy must hold in each agent.
BEi +
m
∑
k=1
OEk = DEi + SEi +
m
∑
k=i
IEk (12)
BHi +
m
∑
k=1
OHk = DHi + SHi + WHi +
m
∑
k=i
IHk (13)
∀Kwi ∈ K : BKwi =
m
∑
k=i
IKwik (14)
Agent pi will decide his bids for the markets by solving the following minimization problem.
min Ji (15)
s.t. (8), (12), (13), (14)
∀uk ∈ Ui : Γk
Each agent finds the amount of purchased/sold energies and input energies for his conversion
devices that minimize his own cost under the constraints of energy balance, the cap on CO2
emissions, characteristics of devices.
Bidding strategies of agents introduced in Section 2.2 could be expressed as follows.
Building
min αBEe BEe+αBEBE+αBGBG+αBH BH (16)
s.t. PH = pBABG
bBA − dBA (17)
BEe + BE = DE (18)
BH + PH = DH (19)
βBEe BEe+βBEBE+βBGBG+βBH BH≤KBuilding (20)
Factory
min αBEe BEe + αBGBG − αSESE − αSHSH (21)
s.t. PEGT = pGTE (BGGT)
bGTE − dGTE (22)
PHGT = pGTH (BGGT)
bGTH − dGTH (23)
PHBA = pBA(BGBA)
bBA − dBA (24)
BEe + PEGT = DE + SE (25)
PHGT + PHBA = DH + SH + WH (26)
BG = BGGT + BGBA (27)
βBEe BEe+βBGBG−βSESE−βSHSH≤ KFactoriy (28)
ǩ
ǩ
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3.4 Demand-Supply Curves
It is know that one of necessary conditions for the convergence of the MOP is convexity of the
production possibility set(Wellman, 1993). The characteristic function of energy conversion
devices is important of the convexity. For example, when the function is given by Equa-
tion (10), the parameter b must hold that b < 1. A typical example of demand-supply curves
in DEMSs is shown in Fig. 5. There exist two characteristics in DEMSs.
equilibrium
price
price
amount
demand curve supply curve
ǩ
-
ǩ-
0
Fig. 5. Demand-supply curves in DEMSs
The first characteristic is that the demand (resp. supply) curve has a gap in the amount be-
tween 0 and some positive value at the price α (resp. α). This is caused by that agents tries to
maximize their economic profits. Namely, α and α are marginal prices so that agents are able
to make a profit. It is profitable for a consumer to purchase the energy in the group when the
price is lower than α, then he will bid a positive value. If the price is higher than α, it is prof-
itable to purchase the energy from outside of the group, then his bid will become 0. Similarly,
a producer will not supply energy in the group when the price is lower than α.
The second characteristic is that there exists a upper limit of the amount for both of the de-
mand and the supply curves. The upper limit for the demand curve comes from the energy
demand of consumers, and the upper limit for the supply curve comes from capacities of
energy conversion devices.
3.5 Execution Procedure
Due to the characteristics described in Section 3.4, a case may happen that no crossing exists,
therefore a simple MOP procedure does not converge to the equilibrium.
There exist two types for such a situation.
1. Over-demand at α (Fig. 6)
When producers are not able to supply enough energy to meet the demand of consumer
agents, the demand exceeds the supply even at (just below of) α. At the next turn, the
price becomes a little bit higher than α, then the demand becomes 0. Therefore vibration
of price may appear.
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price
amount
demand curve supply curve
ǩ
-
ǩ
-
0
Fig. 6. Over-demand at α
In this case, the supplied energy is shared among consumer agents and the shortage
must be managed by other methods. By introducing a cap on the demand in the MOP
procedure, we realize that.
2. Over-supply at α (Fig. 7)
When suppliers produce an ample of energy, the amount of the supply may exceeds the
demands at (just above of) α. At the next turn, the price becomes a little bit lower than
α, then the supply becomes 0. Also in this case, vibration of price may appear.
This kind of situation may occur when a supplier hold a co-generation system and his
heat demand is not much. He operate the co-generation system in order to meet the
electricity demand. But at the same time, plenty of heat will also produced. He may sell
the heat even if the price is 0, but may not sell when the price becomes negative.
In this case, the energy demand is shared among producer agents and the rest is
dumped. By introducing a cap on the supply in the MOP procedure, we realize that.
The idea described above 1. and 2. is realized by the following procedure, see Fig. 8. In the
following the consumer is denoted by pcon, and the set of producers is denoted by S .
At Step1, one market is established for each energy and for each consumer. The initial value
is a pair (α0, β0), where α0 is the initial unit price and β0 is the initial CO2 emissions basic unit.
In each market, d = ∞, and spi = ∞ for each pi ∈ S .
At Step2, the market presents 3-tuple (α, β, d) to the consumer, and (α, β, spi ) to producer
pi ∈ S , where, α is the unit price, β is the CO2 emissions basic unit, d is the upper bound of
the demand, and spi is the upper bound of the supply.
At Step3, the consumer and the producer decide the amount of the demand and the supply
based on the condition that the market presents, respectively. The bidding strategy described
in Section 3.3 is used for the decision.
At Step4, the market updates the price or the upper bound according to the supply and the
demand. The bid amount by the consumer is denoted by bidpcon , and the bid amount by the
ǩ
ǩ
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ǩ
ǩ
price
amount
demand curve supply curve
ǩ-
ǩ-
0
Fig. 7. Over-supply at α
producer pi is denoted by bidpi . At Case 2.3 and Case 3.3, the value of α is updated according
to the equality (29):
α := α + γ(bidcom − ∑
i
bidsupi ), (29)
where γ > 0 is a parameter. The equality (29) raises the unit price when over-demand, and
lowers it when over-supply.
Steps from 2 to 4 are repeated until the condition of Step4-Case 1 holds in all markets.
4. Computational Experiments
4.1 Energy Trading Decision Methods
This section introduces other energy allocation methods briefly.
4.1.1 Individual Optimization
Under the individual optimization method, each agent purchases energy only from outside
of the group, and optimizes its running plan of conversion devices. By using this method, we
can calculate group cost and cost for each agent under a condition that internal energy trading
is not used.
4.1.2 Whole Optimization
The whole optimization method considers the group as one agent, and does optimization for
the whole group. In this case the cap on emissions is imposed on the whole group. We can
calculate lower bound cost for the group by using this method. This lower bound is optimal,
and we cannot get better plan than that. With this method, we can get an energy purchase
and running plan of devices, but we cannot get cost and CO2 emission for each agent.
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Step 1 Establish Markets
Step 2 Present Conditions
Step 3 Bid
Step 4 Update Condition
Case 1 bidpcon = Σpi∈Sbidpi
If this condition holds in all markets, the MOP procedure finishes.
Case 2 bidpcon < Σpi∈Sbidpi
Case 2.1 d < Σpi∈Sbidpi
The market raises d.
Case 2.2 d ≥ Σpi∈Sbidpi ∧ α ≤ α
The market lowers spi for each pi ∈ S . The value of spi is de-
cided in proportion to bidpi and under the constraint of an equality
Σpi∈S spi = bidpcon .
Case 2.3 d ≥ Σpi∈Sbidpi ∧ α > α
The market lowers α.
Case 3 bidcom > Σpi∈Sbidpi
Case 3.1 bidpcon > Σpi∈S spi
The market raises spi for each pi ∈ S .
Case 3.2 bidpcon ≤ Σpi∈S spi ∧ α ≥ α
The market lowers d. The value of d is Σpi∈S spi .
Case 3.3 bidpcon ≤ Σpi∈Sspi ∧ α < α
The market raises α.
The MOP procedure goes back to Step2.
Fig. 8. Execution procedure
4.1.3 Multi-attribute and Multi-item Auction
Miyamoto et al. (2007) proposed an energy trading decision method based on English auction
protocol(David et al., 2002). This method is a multi-attribute auction because it uses two
attributes: unit price and CO2 emission basic unit. Also it is a multi-item auction because
energy demands could be divided into several demands with small energy amount.
This method expresses energy value by
ν = λα + µβ, (30)
where α is unit price, β is CO2 emission basic unit, and λ and µ are parameters. A consumer
shows three items: amount of energy demand, λ and µ. Producers bid three items: their
amount of energy supply, α, and β. After some iterations, winning producers get rights to
supply.
When an agent holds a conversion device, such as a gas turbine, that is able to produce more
than one types of energy, electricity trading and heat trading are inseparable for the agent.
Therefore, in (Miyamoto et al., 2007) we adopted a sequential method; we decide electricity
trading first and then decide heat trading.
4.2 Configuration
In the following experiments, we used parameters shown in Tables 1 and 2.
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αBEe [yen/kWh] 10.39
βBEe [kg-CO2/kWh] 0.317
αBG[yen/m
3] 28.6
βBG[kg-CO2/m
3] 1.991
Table 1. Unit price and CO2 emission basic unit of electricity and gas from outside of the
group
Building Factory 1 Factory 2
pBA 35.03 37.22 37.02
bBA 0.85 0.85 0.85
dBA 5000 8000 8000
PHBA 10000 10000 5000
pGTE - 17.91 16.32
bGTE - 0.85 0.85
dGTE - 6000 6200
PEGT - 50000 30000
pGTH - 31.84 25.87
bGTH - 0.85 0.85
dGTH - 2200 2200
Table 2. Parameters of energy conversion devices
Table 1 shows unit price and CO2 emission basic unit of electricity and gas purchased from
outside of the group. These values are taken from Web pages of power and gas company in
Japan.
Table 2 shows parameters of conversion devices, where PHBA is the maximum output heat of
the boiler, and PEGT is the maximum output electricity of the gas-turbine.
4.3 Ex1: Evaluation of Concurrent Evolution
This experiment is done in order to evaluate the concurrent evolution of electricity and heat
trading. Table 3 shows energy demands and the cap on CO2 emissions for each agent.
Building Factory 1 Factory 2
DE[kWh] 12000 40000 20000
DH[Mcal] 10000 30000 15000
K[kg-CO2] 7500 20000 15000
Table 3. Ex1: energy demands and caps on emissions
Experimental results are shown in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7.
By the auction method (Table 5), the producer agent assumes that amount of heat trade is zero
when the agent calculate a bid for electricity auction. The agent cannot allow for emissions
reduction through heat trading, and electricity sales of Factory 2 resulted in only 4748.1[kWh].
The agent cannot produce further electricity due to the caps.
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Factory 1 Factory 2 Building total
BEe[kWh] 51.4 0.0 2000.0 2051.4
BG[m3] 10802.9 9195.3 342.5 20340.7
BE[kWh] - - 10000.0 10000.0
BH[Mcal] - - 10000.0 10000.0
SE[kWh] 0.0 10000.0 - 10000.0
SH[Mcal] 6747.2 3252.8 - 10000.0
CO2[kg-CO2] 20000.0 14402.7 6745.9 41148.6
cost[yen] 309497.0 159258.5 134302.6 603058.1
Table 4. Ex1: energy allocation by the MOP method
Factory 1 Factory 2 Building total
BEe[kWh] 2303.3 1840.5 6704.6 10848.4
BG[m3] 10357.1 7240.9 342.5 17940.5
BE[kWh] - - 5295.4 5295.4
BH[Mcal] - - 10000.0 10000.0
SE[kWh] 547.3 4748.1 - 5295.4
SH[Mcal] 9999.0 1.0 - 10000.0
CO2[kg-CO2] 20000.0 15000.0 4158.4 39158.4
cost[yen] 320144.3 184830.9 120837.9 625813.1
Table 5. Ex1: energy allocation by the auction method
Factory 1 Factory 2 Building total
BEe[kWh] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BG[m3] 13152.0 7331.0 342.5 20825.5
BE[kWh] - - 12000.0 12000.0
BH[Mcal] - - 10000.0 10000.0
SE[kWh] 8760.0 3240.0 - 12000.0
SH[Mcal] 10000.0 0.0 - 10000.0
CO2[kg-CO2] - - - 41463.6
cost[yen] - - - 595609.3
Table 6. Ex1: energy allocaiton by the whole optimization method
On the other hand, Factory 2 succeeded to sell electricity of 10000[kWh] by the MOP method
(Table 4), because the agent could take emissions reduction through heat trading into con-
sideration. This trade could not be achieved through sequential method such as the auction
method. The MOP method succeeded to obtain better solution by deciding electricity and
heat trade concurrently.
The whole optimization method worked out an optimal solution (Table 6), and Factory 1
which has the most efficient gas turbine produced most electricity and heat for Building. As a
result, the group does not buy any electricity from the outside. As for group costs, we can say
that group cost by the MOP method is not so different from cost by the whole optimization.
Note that this method cannot decide the cost and CO2 emissions for each agent.
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Factory 1 Factory 2 Building total
BEe[kWh] 7780.0 0.0 12000.0 19780.0
BG[m3] 8806.0 6463.0 1247.0 16516.0
BE[kWh] - - 0.0 0.0
BH[Mcal] - - 0.0 0.0
SE[kWh] 0.0 0.0 - 0.0
SH[Mcal] 0.0 0.0 - 0.0
CO2[kg-CO2] 19999.0 12867.8 6286.8 39153.6
cost[yen] 332685.8 184841.8 160344.2 677871.8
Table 7. Ex1: energy allocation by the individual optimization method
The resulting plan by the individual optimizationwas expensive because internal energy trad-
ing was not used. The result (Table 7) shows effectiveness of the internal energy trading.
4.4 Ex2: Evaluation for Consumer’s Demand Change
This experiment is done in order to evaluate efficiency of the methods under a change of con-
sumer’s demands. Energy demands and caps on CO2 emissions for each agent are shown in
Table 8. We fixed electricity demand and increased head demand by 10000[Mcal] of Building
who is a consumer in the group. In this case, factories begin to start their boiler as electricity
demand increases. In order to exclude influences of emissions constraints, the cap on emis-
sions for Building was set enough large as 35000[kg-CO2].
Building Factory 1 Factory 2
DE[kWh] 12000 40000 20000
DH[Mcal] 10000∼110000 30000 15000
K[kg-CO2] 35000 30000 20000
Table 8. Ex2: energy demands and caps on emissions
4.4.1 Comparison on Group Cost
Figure 9 shows transitions of group costs by each method when heat demand of Building
changes.
Costs by all methods except the individual optimization are constant until 90000[Mcal]. This
is because heat was over produced in order to produce electricity and internal trading of heat
does not effect the group costs. When heat demand exceeds 100000[Mcal], agents have to start
their boiler to meet the heat demand, and then the group costs increases.
In comparison to the individual optimization, which does not use internal trading, other three
methods succeeded to reduce the group costs. This result shows that it is possible to reduce a
group cost by introducing internal energy trading. For every heat demands, the MOPmethod
obtains near optimal solutions, and they were better than the solutions by the auction method.
This is an effect of the concurrent evolution.
4.4.2 Comparison on Agent Costs
Figure 10 shows transitions of CO2 emissions for each agent by the MOP method, and Fig. 11
shows transitions by the auction method.
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Fig. 10. Ex2: transition of CO2 emissions by the MOP method
As depicted in Fig. 10, by the MOP method emissions by Building increases linearly, and
emissions of Factories 1 and 2 decease as heat demand increases. In this experiment, since
CO2 emission basic unit of heat is fixed as a positive value
1, emissions by consumers increases
as heat demand increases, and producers can reduce their emissions by shifting emissions to
the consumer.
1 Actually the value is the same with a basic unit calculated by assuming that Building use its own boiler.


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Fig. 11. Ex2: transition of CO2 emissions by the auction method
On the other hand, as depicted in Fig. 11, by the auction method emissions by each agent
were constant. In the auction method, producers can decide CO2 emission basic unit for their
bid. In this experiment, since caps on emissions for each agent was large enough, producers
chose zero as CO2 emission basic unit for their bids in order to reduce costs. As a result, CO2
emissions by Factory 1 and 2 stayed at high level, and emissions by Building stayed at low
level.
The MOP method at this point does not include a mechanism to change a value of CO2 emis-
sion basic unit dynamically. This may cause a situation that results by the MOP becomes
worse than the auction method when a cap on emissions for a producer is small. In order
to confirm this prospect, the next experiment is done by changing caps on emissions for a
producer.
4.5 Ex3: Evaluation on Caps on Emissions Change
Building Factory 1 Factory 2
DE[kWh] 12000 40000 20000
DH[Mcal] 10000 30000 15000
K[kg-CO2] 7500 20000 11000∼20000
Table 9. Ex3: energy demands and caps on emissions
Energy demands and caps on CO2 emissions for each agent are shown in Table 9. We fixed
the cap on CO2 emissions for Factory 1 as 20000[kg-CO2], and changed the cap for Factory 2.
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Figure 12 shows transitions of group costs by each method when the cap on emissions for
Factory 2 changes.
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As depicted in Fig. 12, group costs by the MOPmethod are lower than the costs by the auction
method when the caps on emissions for Factory 2 is larger than or equals to 12000[kg-CO2].
The group cost by the auction method, however, becomes lowwhen the cap is 11000[kg-CO2].
Figure 13 shows transitions of electricity trade of Factory 2 by the MOP and the auction meth-
ods. When the cap was 11000[kg-CO2], electricity was not traded internally by the MOP
method, but was traded by the auction method. Since the MOP method at this point does
not include a mechanism to change a value of CO2 emission basic unit dynamically, Fac-
tory 2 chose zero as its supply for electricity market when the cap was less than or equals to
12000[kg-CO2].
In the auction method, producers can decide CO2 emission basic unit for their bid. Table 10
show combinations of unit price and CO2 emission basic unit of bids by Factory 2. The table
shows that Factory 2 selected a scheme to reduce emissions by setting unit price as zero and
emission basic unit as a positive value when the cap was less than or equals to 12000[kg-CO2].
As a result, the auction method succeeded to trade electricity internally for every cases.
Factory 1 Factory 2
KFactory2 α β α β
20000 0 0.9577 8.7153 0
15000 0 0.9577 8.7153 0
13000 0 0.9577 8.7153 0
12000 0 0.9577 0 1.1149
11000 0 0.9577 0 0.9577
Table 10. Ex3: change of unit price and CO2 emission basic unit
As described above, we found that the MOP method at this point may lose an opportunity to
deal internally in same special cases such as the cap on emissions for a producer is small.
4.6 Ex4: Evaluation on CO2 Emissions Reduction
This experiment is done in order to evaluate possibility of CO2 emissions reduction by the
methods. Energy demands and caps on CO2 emissions for each agent are shown in Table 11.
Building Factory 1 Factory 2
DE[kWh] 12000 40000 20000
DH[Mcal] 10000 30000 15000
Table 11. Ex4: energy demands and caps on emissions
Table 12 shows caps on CO2 emissions for each agent, and CO2 emissions basic units which
were used for the MOP method. At first, we calculated minimal CO2 emissions by using the
individual optimization method for each agent. Values of this emissions were the caps at the
first step, then the caps are decreased in the same rate r%. We evaluated whether each method
is able to obtain a feasible solution. In case of the MOP method, we decreased also the CO2
emissions basic unit in the same rate, so that Building meets the cap constraint.
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r[%] KFactory1 KFactory2 KBuilding βE βH
0 16999 11000 6286 0.317 0.226
1 16829 10890 6223 0.313 0.223
2 16659 10780 6161 0.310 0.221
3 16489 10670 6098 0.307 0.219
4 16319 10560 6035 0.304 0.216
5 16149 10450 5972 0.301 0.214
6 15979 10340 5909 0.297 0.212
7 15809 10230 5846 0.294 0.210
Table 12. Ex4: caps on CO2 emissions and basic units
r[%] MOP Auction Whole
1 - 725400 710533
2 - 727623 717715
3 - - 725179
4 - - 732999
5 - - 741153
6 - - 749876
7 - - -
Table 13. Ex4: group costs when emissions basic units in Table 12 are used
r[%] MOP Auction Whole
1 710927 725400 710533
2 718397 727623 717715
3 725862 - 725179
4 733687 - 732999
5 741854 - 741153
6 751673 - 749876
7 - - -
Table 14. Ex4: group costs when βE = 0.502, βH = 0.020
Group costs by each method when emissions basic units in Table 12 were used are shown in
Table 13. The whole optimization method succeeded to reduce CO2 emissions of 6% from
the individual optimization. This shows that by using internal energy trading it is possible to
reduce CO2 of maximally 6% in this case. The auction method succeeded to reduce emissions
in 2%, and the MOP method failed to reduce.
In the case of this example, Factories have to operate their gas turbine further to produce
electricity for internal trade, and then their emissions increases. On the other hand, since
Factories have overly produced heat, internal trade of heat does not increase their emissions.
Factories need to shift their emissions onto selling electricity.
Therefore, we set CO2 emissions basic unit of electricity (resp. heat) as 0.502[kg-CO2/kWh]
(resp. 0.020[kg-CO2/m
3]), and examined again. Results are shown in Table 14. In this case,
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the MOPmethod succeeded to reduce emissions in 6%, and the group cost was close to that of
the optimal solution. The auction method is not able to reduce further since Factories cannot
allow for heat trade. The result shows that theMOPmethod is effective also for CO2 emissions
reduction.
The above discussion suggests to develop CO2 emissions basic unit control mechanism in
the MOP method. To do that, we have to develop the following two methods: 1) a method
to sense a situation where basic unit should be adjusted, and 2) a method to adjust the ba-
sic unit. Our resent research considers how to realize the CO2 emissions basic unit control
mechanism(Sugimoto et al., 2008a;b).
5. Conclusion
This chapter considered energy management in a group which is composed of plural corpo-
rate entities. Entities perform optimal planning of purchasing primal energy and operating
energy conversion devices in order to satisfy energy demands. Moreover a cap on CO2 emis-
sions is imposed on each entity, and it is not allowed to exhaust CO2 more than their caps.
This chapter discussed effectiveness the energy trading in the group.
In order to make the problem simple, we supposed the UC problemwith only one time period
and all of the energy conversion devices were active, and we discussed how to decide energy
allocation among entities. So far, we had proposed an auction based method(Miyamoto et al.,
2007), but the method had a problem on efficiency. Therefore we proposed the MOP based
method for deciding energy allocation. In order to decide energy allocation in DEMSs, we
formulated the group, and showed the MOP based execution procedure.
Next this chapter compared energy trading decision methods by computational experiments.
The proposed MOP method succeeded to obtain better solutions than the previous auction
method. We, however, found a necessity to develop CO2 emissions basic unit control mecha-
nism in the MOP method.
Directions of next research includes a) the CO2 emissions basic unit control mecha-
nism(Sugimoto et al., 2008a), b) groups with plural consumers(Sugimoto et al., 2008b), and
c) planning over plural periods.
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